

*See p. 2.*  
*N. B. 2/11/64*  
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USIB-D-24.6/1

18 November 1964

Noted at NCM 410

*expedite to NH for NMC*

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Middle East Task Force Report

REFERENCE : a. SC # 07719-64  
b. USIB-M-349, item 6, 16 September 1964

1. The Chairman of USIB has authorized circulation of the enclosed memorandum on the subject from [REDACTED] to the Board members for discussion and for consideration of the recommendations in paragraphs 4 and 9. Initially, the report of the Task Force headed by Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., (reference a.) was forwarded by the National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff (NIPE) to the USIB members whose interests were directly involved. The NIPE Staff has now forwarded copies of this report to the other members as well as to the Service Intelligence Chiefs. 25X1A9a

2. The subject report was discussed briefly at a USIB meeting (reference b.) and at a luncheon attended by USIB members. Although the report makes no recommendations for major change, it does suggest a number of points which appear to require further consideration or action on a world-wide, rather than a regional basis. These points are contained in paragraph three of the enclosed memorandum.

3. The enclosed memorandum will be placed on the agenda of an early USIB meeting for discussion and consideration.

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Executive Secretary

Attachments

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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Attachment  
USIB-D-24.6/1  
18 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, The United States Intelligence Board

SUBJECT: Middle East Task Force Report

1. The report of the Task Force headed by Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr. concerning the U.S. intelligence effort directed towards ten countries of the Middle East, together with its statistical annex, has been circulated to members of USIB whose interests are directly involved in the report. Copies have gone to the Deputy Director of CIA; the Director, DIA, the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Director, NSA. Certain components have given us preliminary comments.

2. The report has been the subject of a rather brief discussion at a USIB meeting and at a luncheon attended by USIB members. The report is generally reassuring. It concludes that "in the collection and production of intelligence, in the coordination of means and effort among various agencies involved, and in the use of manpower and money, the picture is generally good." It contains no recommendations for major changes in the organization or functioning of the intelligence effort directed against the particular countries under review. The report, together with the statistical annex, contains a reasonably comprehensive statement of the cost of the various programs involved in the effort, the number and quality of the personnel committed, the allocation of effort and manpower as between different geographic areas and functions, a rough approximation of the extent of the Soviet effort aimed against these same countries, and a summary of the report coverage accomplished during the period on which the study was primarily focused (September - November 1963 inclusive). The expository portions of the report are more than adequate to give considerable visibility to the intelligence effort aimed against this area.

3. Although it makes no recommendations for major change, the report does suggest a number of points which appear to require further consideration or action on a world-wide, rather than a regional, basis. These include:

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a. The question whether the analytical effort of the community is adequate to exploit the information available. This involves consideration of whether the numbers and qualifications of personnel engaged in analysis are adequate and appropriate or whether action should be taken to strengthen the components of the community concerned with the production of intelligence reports and estimates. This raises two subsidiary questions. One is whether new or improved systems for reviewing events after the fact to correct or substantiate previous conclusions should be instituted. It also suggests the possibility that the use of production manpower is concentrated too much on the more critical situations to the neglect of continuing and balanced application to other important targets. //

b. Related to the subject discussed in paragraph 3a above are two further questions: Whether more could be done to provide "analysts - producers" with the opportunity for first-hand knowledge of the country or area with which they are concerned; and whether an effort should be made to develop production "country specialists" with continuity of experience and expertise on particular individual countries.

c. The suggestion is made that the ratio between "field support personnel" to "collectors" in the field deserves watching. The validity of this observation depends to some degree on the validity which is attached to the definition of "support personnel" as opposed to "collectors." Definitions of this character are inevitably bound to be contentious and never achieve a degree of precision which will satisfy everybody. Nevertheless, the question of whether the balance between the number of individuals engaged in administrative support, appropriately defined, as against those engaged in substantive production or operational activity deserves continuing study.

d. Some redundancy and duplication in the issuance of requirements is noted and efforts to improve coordination among Washington agencies to reduce this duplication to the absolute minimum are recommended.

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4. Certain conclusions of the report are of primary or exclusive concern to an individual agency or component of the intelligence community. In this category are the comments included in paragraph 6 of the summary and recommendations of the report concerning measures to improve the analysis and evaluation of sheets of traffic disseminated by NSA. It is recommended that the Director, NSA be requested to submit such comments as he may think appropriate on this subject.

5. Paragraph 7 of the summary and recommendations of the report deals with the necessity of preparing alternatives to existing bases for SIGINT collection. This matter is already under active review in connection with reports required under NSAM 301.


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7. Two matters of considerable importance to the administration of the intelligence community are discussed in the foreword to the statistical annex to the report. One of these concerns the difficulty of establishing comparable categories, as between different agencies of the community, to show the totality of costs and personnel strengths committed to particular programs or against particular target entities. It is hoped that the report will result in further support for the efforts of the National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE) Staff to stimulate the development of a community-wide census of U.S. personnel engaged in designated categories of intelligence activity, and also to devise some form of reporting or "bookkeeping" procedures which will make it possible to assess the total cost of activities conducted by different components of the community for particular functional purposes or targeted against particular areas.

8. A second deficiency identified in the foreword of the statistical annex to the report is the lack of centralized indexing to permit recovery of reports and finished intelligence relating to

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particular intelligence topics. This finding suggests the necessity for further support to the efforts of the USIB Committee on Documentation and the need for periodic reports from this Committee concerning the status of progress towards the development of compatible files and indices, and related techniques.

9. As the suggestions enumerated in paragraph 3 for further investigation appear to be legitimate and to involve several components of the community, it is recommended that an ad hoc committee, including representation from ~~25X1A9a~~ DIA, INR and NSA, be constituted under the chairmanship of  to investigate the areas suggested and to make such recommendations as may be appropriate.

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Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence  
for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation

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